The term premium on nominal long-term bonds in the standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model used in macroeconomics is far too small and stable relative to empirical measures obtained from the data-an example of the "bond premium puzzle." However, in models of endowment economies, researchers have been able to generate reasonable term premiums by assuming that investors have recursive Epstein-Zin preferences and face long-run economic risks. We show that introducing Epstein-Zin preferences into a canonical DSGE model can also produce a large and variable term premium without compromising the model's ability to …t key macroeconomic variables. Long-run real and nominal risks further improve the model's ability to …t the data with a lower level of household risk aversion.
Introduction
The term premium on long-term nominal bonds compensates investors for in ‡ation and consumption risks over the lifetime of the bond. A large …nance literature …nds that these risk premiums are substantial and vary signi…cantly over time (e.g., Shiller, 1991, Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005) ; however, the economic forces that can justify such large and variable term premiums are less clear. Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) provide some economic insight into the source of a large positive mean term premium in a consumption-based asset pricing model of an endowment economy. Their analysis relies on two crucial features: …rst, the structural assumption that investors have Epstein-Zin recursive utility preferences, 1 and second, an estimated reduced-form process for the joint determination of consumption and in ‡ation. With these two elements, they show that investors require a premium for holding nominal bonds because a positive in ‡ation surprise lowers a bond's value and is associated with lower future consumption growth. In such a situation, bondholders'wealth decreases just as their marginal utility rises, so they require a premium to o¤set this risk. Using a similar structure-characterized by both Epstein-Zin preferences and reduced-form consumption and in ‡ation empirics-Bansal and Shaliastovich (2007) also obtain signi…cant time variation in the term premium.
While these endowment economy results are illuminating, there are several reasons to reconsider these questions in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework. First, endowment economy analyses rely on exogenous, reduced-form speci…cations for consumption and in ‡ation that have no structural foundation and may not be stable over time (see, e.g., Benigno (2006) ). In the 1970s, for example, oil shocks were unusually large, the correlation between in ‡ation and output was unusually negative, and the term premium was unusually high. A structural DSGE analysis can explain the relationship between these changes and can model the term premium even in the presence of structural breaks, something a reduced-form analysis cannot do. Second, endowment economy studies consider whether a particular speci…cation for household preferences is consistent with asset prices, taking the macroeconomic data as given; they are completely silent on the issue of whether their preference speci…cations 1 Early on, Kreps and Porteus (1978) established the theoretical framework for such recursive preferences, which were further developed by Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) .
are consistent with the macro data. This is a signi…cant concern: Lettau and Uhlig (2000) argue that Campbell-Cochrane (1999) habits are inconsistent with the macroeconomic data despite being consistent with the equity premium in an endowment economy setting. Our DSGE analysis uses both asset prices and macro data to evaluate the overall success of the model. Third, endowment economy results for asset prices may not carry over to the DSGE setting:
for example, Wachter (2006) matches the mean term premium in an endowment economy using Campbell-Cochrane (1999) habits, but Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) show that these preferences generate only a negligible term premium in a DSGE model, because households in the DSGE setting can endogenously smooth consumption. That is, when households are hit by a negative shock in a DSGE model, they can o¤set that shock by working more hours, which allows them to smooth their marginal utility of consumption. Since the marginal utility of consumption is smoother, assets are less risky. 2 Finally, asset prices provide a check on the implications of standard macroeconomic DSGE models: if these models are well-speci…ed, they
should be able to match basic asset pricing facts as well as basic facts about macroeconomic quantities.
The basic asset pricing fact on which we focus is the risk premium on long-term nominal bonds. The long-term bond premium has received less attention in the literature than the equity premium, but it has a number of practical and theoretical advantages. From a practical perspective, the value of long-term bonds outstanding in the U.S. (and in other countries) is far larger than the value of equities. Central banks also use the yield curve to measure expectations about monetary policy and in ‡ation, so understanding movements in bond risk premiums is important for monetary policy. From a theoretical perspective, bonds are extremely simple to model, consisting of only a constant nominal coupon on a default-free government obligation; equities, in contrast, require modeling dividends and leverage, not to mention the possibility of intangible capital, growth options, and other complications. Relative to the equity premium, the bond premium also provides an additional metric with which to assess model performance: for example, Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) show that the presence of capital immobility in a two-sector DSGE model can account for the equity premium because it increases the variance of the price of capital and its covariance with consumption; however, this mechanism cannot explain a long-term bond premium, which involves the valuation of a constant nominal coupon on a default-free government bond. Finally, the bond premium is closely related to the behavior of in ‡ation and nominal rigidities, which are crucial and still unresolved aspects of the current generation of DSGE models.
The underlying form of our DSGE model closely follows the standard speci…cation of these models in the literature (e.g., Woodford, 2003 endogenously describe the behavior of in ‡ation, short-term nominal interest rates, and long-term nominal bonds. We evaluate the model based on its ability to match both basic macroeconomic moments (e.g., the standard deviations of consumption and in ‡ation) and basic bond pricing moments (e.g., the means and volatilities of the yield curve slope and bond excess holding period returns). In order to match the bond pricing facts, we augment the standard DSGE model in two ways. First, we assume that households in the model have Epstein-Zin preferences, so risk aversion can be modeled independently from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. 3 Such a separation allows the model to match risk premiums even in the face of the intertemporal substitution possibilities associated with a variable labor supply. Second, we assume that agents in the model face long-run economic risks, as in Bansal and Yaron (2004) . 4 However, because we are pricing a nominal asset, we consider not just long-run real risk, but also long-run nominal risk, in the sense that the central bank's long-run in ‡ation objective may vary over time, as in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) . 5 Together, these two key ingredients-Epstein-Zin preferences and long-run economic riskallow our model to replicate the bond pricing facts without compromising its ability to …t the macroeconomic facts. Intuitively, our model is identical to …rst order to standard macroeconomic DSGE representations because the …rst-order approximation to Epstein-Zin preferences is the same as the …rst-order approximation to standard expected utility preferences. Furthermore, the macroeconomic moments of the model are not very sensitive to the additional second-and 3 Van Binsbergen, Fernández-Villaverde, Koijen, and Rubio-Ramírez (2008) also price bonds in a DSGE model with Epstein-Zin preferences, although their model treats in ‡ation as an exogenous stochastic process and thus su¤ers from some of the same drawbacks as Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) and Bansal and Shaliastovich (2007) . 4 Bansal and Yaron (2004) show that uncertainty about the economy's long-run growth prospects can play an important role in generating sizable equity risk premiums. 5 Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) …nd that the excess sensitivity of long-term bond yields to macroeconomic announcements appears to be due to …nancial markets expecting some degree of pass-through from near-term in ‡ation to the long-term in ‡ation outlook.
higher-order terms introduced by Epstein-Zin preferences, while risk premiums are una¤ected by …rst-order terms and completely determined by those second-and higher-order terms. Therefore, by varying the Epstein-Zin risk-aversion parameter while holding the other parameters of the model constant, we are able to …t the asset pricing facts without compromising the model's ability to …t the macroeconomic data.
Our analysis has implications for both the macroeconomics and …nance literatures. For macroeconomics, our results suggest a path to transform the standard DSGE model into a complete description of the economy. As a theoretical matter, asset prices and the macroeconomy are inextricably linked; indeed, as emphasized by Cochrane (2007) , asset markets are the mechanism by which capital is allocated e¢ ciently across …rms and by which consumption and investment are allocated e¢ ciently across time and states of nature. Therefore, any correctly speci…ed DSGE model must be capable of matching interest rates and other asset prices as well as consumption and in ‡ation. For …nance, our analysis can illuminate the earlier reduced-form results with a structural economic interpretation. We also suggest a resolution to a long-standing puzzle in the bond-pricing literature (Backus, Gregory, and Zin, 1989 , and Den Haan, 1995); namely, why does the yield curve slope upward? If interest rates are low during a recession, then bond prices should be high when consumption is low; as a result, long-term bonds should carry an insurance-like, negative risk premium and the yield curve should-counterfactually-slope downward. In our DSGE model, the yield curve slopes upward because technology shocks cause in ‡ation to rise persistently when consumption falls, so long-term nominal bonds lose rather than gain value in recessions, implying a positive risk premium. More generally, any shock that causes in ‡ation to move persistently and inversely to output, including a markup shock or an oil price shock, will tend to imply such a positive term premium.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 generalizes a standard DSGE model to the case of Epstein-Zin preferences. Section 3 presents results for this model and shows how it is able to match the term premium without impairing the model's ability to …t macroeconomic variables. Section 4 introduces a model with enhanced long-run economic risks, which improves the model's overall …t to the data. Section 5 concludes. A brief technical appendix provides additional details of how general DSGE models can be extended to the case of Epstein-Zin preferences and solved.
A DSGE Model with Epstein-Zin Preferences
In this section, we generalize the simple, stylized DSGE model of Woodford (2003) to the case of Epstein-Zin preferences. We show how to price long-term nominal bonds in this model and present a variety of measures of the term premium and long-term bond risk.
Epstein-Zin Preferences
It is standard practice in macroeconomics to assume that a representative household chooses state-contingent plans for consumption, c, and labor, l, so as to maximize expected utility:
subject to an asset accumulation equation, where 2 (0; 1) is the household's discount factor and the period utility kernel u(c t ; l t ) is twice-di¤erentiable, concave, increasing in c, and decreasing in l. The maximand in equation (1) can be expressed in …rst-order recursive form as:
where the household's state-contingent plans at time t are chosen so as to maximize V t .
In this paper, we follow the …nance literature and generalize (2) to an Epstein-Zin speci…-cation:
where the parameter can take on any real value. 6 If u 0 everywhere, then the proof of Theorem 3.1 in Epstein and Zin (1989) shows that there exists a solution V to (3) with V 0.
If u 0 everywhere, then it is natural to let V 0 and reformulate the recursion as:
The proof in Epstein and Zin (1989) also demonstrates the existence of a solution V to (4) with V 0 in this case. 7 When = 0, both (3) and (4) reduce to the standard case of expected utility (2) . When u 0 everywhere, higher (lower) values of correspond to greater (lesser) degrees of risk aversion. When u 0 everywhere, the opposite is true: higher (lower) values of correspond to lesser (greater) degrees of risk aversion.
Note that, traditionally, Epstein-Zin preferences over consumption streams have been written
as:
but by setting V t = e V t and = 1 e = , this can be seen to correspond to (3) . Moreover, the form (3) has the advantage that it allows us to consider standard DSGE utility kernels involving both labor and inelastic intertemporal substitution ( < 0), which the form (5) cannot easily handle.
The key advantage of using Epstein-Zin utility (3) is that it breaks the equivalence between the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion that has long been noted in the literature regarding expected utility (2)-see, e.g., Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Hall (1988) . In (3), the intertemporal elasticity of substitution over deterministic consumption paths is exactly the same as in (2), but now the household's risk aversion to uncertain lotteries over V t+1 can be ampli…ed by the additional parameter , a feature which is crucial for allowing us to …t both the asset pricing and macroeconomic facts below. 8 We now turn to the utility kernel u. For simplicity, we adopt the usual DSGE speci…cation (e.g., Woodford, 2003) :
which allows for tractable modeling of nominal wage as well as price rigidities-an essential ingredient of many models in this literature. If > 1, then (6) is everywhere negative and V is de…ned by (4) . If 1, then there are two main approaches to ensure that the utility kernel u is everywhere positive. The …rst is to add a constant:
where l denotes the household's time endowment. Note, however, that additive shifts of the utility kernel, as in (7), are nonneutral and a¤ect the household's attitude towards risk, except for the special case of expected utility, = 0. (This will become apparent when we derive the household's stochastic pricing kernel, below.) The second approach is to use (6) but impose that there is some subsistence level c 0 for consumption below which households cannot go.
By setting c high enough, we can ensure that u is positive over the range of admissible values for c and l. Of these two approaches, we will generally opt for the latter when we consider the case < 1 in the estimation below.
The Household' s Optimization Problem
We now turn to the representative household's optimization problem under Epstein-Zin preferences. We assume that households are representative and choose state-contingent consumption and labor plans so as to maximize (3) 
The household's optimization problem is to choose a sequence of vector-valued functions,
, so as to maximize (3) subject to the sequence of budget constraints (8 g:
The household's …rst-order conditions for (9) 
These …rst-order conditions are very similar to the expected utility case except for the introduction of the additional Lagrange multipliers e t;s t , which translate utils at time t into utils at time 0 , allowing for the "twisting"of the value function by 1 that takes place at each time 1; 2; : : : ; t. Note that in the expected utility case, e t;s t = 1 for every t and s t , and equations (10) through (13) reduce to the standard optimality conditions. Similarly, linearizing (10) through (13) separates out e t;s t and causes to drop out, so to …rst order, (10) through (13) are identical to the expected utility case.
Substituting out for e t;s t and e t;s t in (10) through (13) 
where k is a …xed, …rm-speci…c capital stock and A t denotes an aggregate technology shock that a¤ects all …rms. 9 We have suppressed the explicit state-dependence of the variables in this equation and in the remainder of the paper to ease the notational burden. The technology shock A t follows an exogenous AR(1) process:
where " When the Calvo contract expires, the …rm is free to reset its price as it chooses, and we denote the price that the …rm f sets in period t by p t (f ). There is no indexation, so the price p t (f ) is …xed over the life of the contract. In each period t that the contract remains in e¤ect, the …rm must supply whatever output is demanded at the contract price p t (f ), hiring labor l (f ) from households at the market wage w .
Firms are collectively owned by households and distribute pro…ts and losses back to households each period. When a …rm's price contract expires, the …rm chooses the new contract price p t (f ) to maximize the value to shareholders of the …rm's cash ‡ows over the lifetime of the contract (equivalently, the …rm chooses a state-contingent plan for prices that maximizes the value of the …rm to shareholders). That is, the …rm maximizes:
where m t;t+j is the representative household's stochastic discount factor from period t to t + j.
The output of each intermediate …rm f is purchased by a perfectly competitive …nal goods sector that aggregates the continuum of intermediate goods into a single …nal good using a CES production technology:
Each intermediate …rm f thus faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its product:
where P t is the CES aggregate price per unit of the …nal good:
Di¤erentiating (18) with respect to p t (f ) yields the standard optimality condition for the …rm's price:
where mc t (f ) denotes the marginal cost for …rm f at time t:
Aggregate Resource Constraints and the Government
To aggregate up from …rm-level variables to aggregate quantities, it is useful to de…ne crosssectional price dispersion, t :
where the occurrence of the parameter in the exponent is due to the …rm-speci…city of capital.
We de…ne L t , the aggregate quantity of labor demanded by …rms, as:
Then L t satis…es:
where K = k is the capital stock. Equilibrium in the labor market requires that L t = l t , labor demand equals the aggregate labor supplied by the representative households.
In order to study the e¤ects of …scal shocks, we assume that there is a government sector in the model that levies lump-sum taxes G t on households and destroys the resources it collects.
Government consumption follows an exogenous AR(1) process:
where " Thus, the aggregate resource constraint implies that
where C t = c t , the consumption of the representative household.
Finally, there is a monetary authority in the economy which sets the one-period continuouslycompounded nominal interest rate i t according to a Taylor-type policy rule:
where log(1= ) is the steady-state real interest rate in the model, Y denotes the steady-state level of output, denotes the steady-state rate of in ‡ation, " i t denotes an i.i.d. stochastic monetary policy shock with mean zero and variance 2 i , and i , g y , and g are parameters. 10 The variable t denotes a geometric moving average of in ‡ation:
where current-period in ‡ation t log(P t =P t 1 ) and we set = 0:7 so that the geometric average in (30) has an e¤ective duration of about four quarters, which is typical in estimates of the Taylor rule.
11 10 In equation (29) (and equation (29) only), we express i t , t , and 1= in annualized terms, so that the coe¢ cients g and g y correspond directly to the estimates in the empirical literature. We also follow the literature by assuming an "inertial" policy rule with i.i.d. policy shocks, although there are a variety of reasons to be dissatis…ed with the assumption of AR(1) processes for all stochastic disturbances except the one asociated with short-term interest rates. Indeed, Rudebusch (2002 Rudebusch ( , 2006 and Carrillo, Fève, and Matheron (2007) provide strong evidence that an alternative policy speci…cation with serially correlated shocks and little gradual adjustment is more consistent with the dynamic behavior of nominal interest rates. 11 Including the usual four-quarter moving average of in ‡ation in the policy rule adds three lags ( t 1 , t 2 , and t 3 ) as state variables, while our geometric average adds only one lag ( t 1 ). All results are very similar for either speci…cation.
Long-Term Bonds and the Term Premium
The price of any asset in the model economy must satisfy the standard stochastic discounting relationship in which the household's stochastic discount factor is used to value the statecontingent payo¤s of the asset in period t + 1. For example, the price of a default-free n-period zero-coupon bond that pays one dollar at maturity satis…es:
where m t+1 m t;t+1 , p (n) t denotes the price of the bond at time t, and p (0) t 1, i.e., the time-t price of one dollar delivered at time t is one dollar. The continuously-compounded yield to maturity on the n-period zero-coupon bond is de…ned to be:
In the U.S. data, the benchmark long-term bond is the ten-year Treasury note. Thus, we wish to model the term premium on a bond with a duration of about ten years. Computationally, it is inconvenient to work with a zero-coupon bond that has more than a few periods to maturity; instead, it is much easier to work with an in…nitely-lived consol-style bond that has a timeinvariant or time-symmetric structure. 12 Thus, we assume that households in the model can buy and sell a long-term default-free nominal consol which pays a geometrically declining coupon in every period in perpetuity. The nominal consol's price per one dollar of coupon in period t, which we denote by e p (n) t , then satis…es:
where c is the rate of decay of the coupon on the consol. By choosing an appropriate value for c , we can thus model prices of a bond of any desired Macaulay duration or maturity n, such as the ten-year maturity that serves as our zero-coupon benchmark in the data. 13 Finally, the continuously-compounded yield to maturity on the consol, e { (n) t , is given by:
Note that even though the nominal bond in our model is default-free, it is still risky in the sense that its price can covary with the household's marginal utility of consumption. For example, when in ‡ation is expected to be higher in the future, then the price of the bond generally falls, because households discount its future nominal coupons more heavily. If times of high in ‡ation are correlated with times of low output (as is the case for technology shocks in the model), then households regard the nominal bond as being very risky, because it loses value at exactly those times when the household values consumption the most. Alternatively, if in ‡ation is not very correlated with output and consumption, then the bond is correspondingly less risky. In the former case, we would expect the bond to carry a substantial risk premium (its price would be lower than the risk-neutral price), while in the latter case we would expect the risk premium to be smaller.
In the literature, the risk premium or term premium on a long-term bond is typically expressed as the di¤erence between the yield on the bond and the unobserved risk-neutral yield for that same bond. To de…ne the term premium in our model, then, we …rst de…ne the risk-neutral price of the consol, b p
where i t;t+j P j n=0 i n . Equation (35) is the expected present discounted value of the coupons of the consol, where the discounting is performed using the risk-free rate rather than the household's stochastic discount factor. Equivalently, equation (35) can be expressed in …rst-order recursive form as:
which directly parallels (33) . The implied term premium on the consol is then given by:
which is the di¤erence between the observed yield to maturity on the consol and the risk-neutral yield to maturity. For a given set of structural parameters of the model, we will choose c so that the bond has a Macaulay duration of n = 40 quarters, and we will multiply equation (37) by 400 in order to report the term premium in units of annualized percentage points rather than logs.
The term premium in equation (37) can also be expressed more directly in terms of the stochastic discount factor, which can be useful for gaining intuition about how the term premium is related to the various economic shocks driving our DSGE model. First, use (33) and (36) to write the di¤erence between the consol price and the risk-neutral consol price as:
Equation (38) makes it clear that, even though the bond price depends only on the one-periodahead covariance between the stochastic discount factor and next period's bond price, the term premium depends on this covariance over the entire lifetime of the bond.
14 Of course, the term premium is usually written as the di¤erence between the yield on the long-term bond and the risk-neutral yield on that bond. From (37),
where p (n) t denotes the nonstochastic steady-state bond price. 15 Intuitively, the term premium is larger the more negative is the covariance between the stochastic discount factor and the price of the bond over the lifetime of the bond.
14 An exactly analogous expression holds for the case of a zero-coupon bond. 15 The …rst-order approximation on the second line of (39) is useful for gaining intuition and is a good approximation because the bond prices b p (n) t and e p (n) t are about 40 for the parameterizations of the model we consider below. However, when we solve for the term premium in the model numerically, our solution will include the second-and third-order as well as the …rst-order terms.
Alternative Measures of Long-Term Bond Risk
Although the term premium is the cleanest conceptual measure of the riskiness of long-term bonds, it is not directly observed in the data and must be inferred using term structure models or other methods. Accordingly, the literature has also focused on two other directly observed empirical measures that are closely related to the term premium: the slope of the yield curve and the excess return to holding the long-term bond for one period relative to the one-period short rate.
The slope of the yield curve is simply the di¤erence between the yield to maturity on the long-term bond and the one-period risk-free rate, i t . The slope is an imperfect measure of the riskiness of the long-term bond because it can vary in response to shocks even if all investors in the model are risk-neutral. However, on average, the slope of the yield curve equals the term premium, and the volatility of the slope provides us with a noisy measure of the volatility of the term premium.
A second measure of the riskiness of long-term bonds is the excess one-period holding return-that is, the return to holding the bond for one period less the one-period risk-free rate. For the case of an n-period zero-coupon bond, this excess return is given by:
The …rst term on the right-hand side of (40) is the gross return to holding the bond and the second term is the gross one-period risk-free return. For the case of the consol in our model, the excess holding period return is a bit more complicated, since the consol pays a coupon in period t 1 and then depreciates in value by the factor c , so the excess holding period return is given by:
Again, the …rst term on the right-hand side of (41) is the gross return to holding the consol and includes the one-dollar coupon in period t 1 that can be invested in the one-period security.
As with the yield curve slope, the excess returns in (40) and (41) are imperfect measures of the term premium because they would vary in response to shocks even if investors were risk-neutral.
However, the mean and standard deviation of the excess holding period return provide popular measures of the average term premium and the volatility of the term premium. Because of this high dimensionality, discretization and projection methods are computationally infeasible, so we solve the model using the standard macroeconomic technique of approximation around the nonstochastic steady state-so-called perturbation methods. However, a …rst-order approximation of the model (i.e., a linearization or log-linearization) eliminates the term premium entirely, because equations (33) and (36) Once we have computed an approximate solution to the model, we compare the model and the data using a standard set of macroeconomic and …nancial moments, such as the standard deviations of consumption, labor, and other variables, and the means and standard deviations of the term premium and the alternative measures of long-term bond risk described above.
Model Solution Method
One method of computing these moments is by simulation, but this method is slow and, for a nonlinear model, the simulations can sometimes diverge to in…nity. We thus compute these moments in closed form, using perturbation methods. In particular, we compute the unconditional standard deviations and unconditional means of the variables of the model to second order. 17 For the term premium, the unconditional standard deviation is zero to second order, 16 The number of state variables can be reduced a bit by noting that G t and A t are su¢ cient to incorporate all of the information from G t 1 , A t 1 , " G t , and " A t , but the basic point remains valid, namely, that the number of state variables in the model is large from a computational point of view. 17 To compute the standard deviations of the variables to second order, we compute a fourth-order accurate solution to the unconditional covariance matrix of the variables and then take the square root along the diagonal. Note that a third-order accurate solution for X and Y is su¢ cient to compute the product E[XY ] to fourth so we compute the unconditional standard deviation of the term premium to third order. This method yields results that are extremely close to those that arise from simulation, while at the same time being quicker and more numerically robust.
Comparing the Epstein-Zin DSGE Model to the Data
We now investigate whether the standard DSGE model, extended to the case of Epstein-Zin preferences as developed in the previous section, is consistent with the most basic features of the macroeconomic and …nancial market data. We …rst investigate the behavior of the model under a baseline set of parameter values and then vary those parameters to …nd the best possible …t of the model to the data.
Model Parameterization
The baseline parameter values that we use for our simple New Keynesian model are reported in Table 1 and are fairly standard in the literature (e.g., Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams, 2005). We set the household's discount factor, , to .99 per quarter, implying a steady-state real interest rate of 4.02 percent per year. We set households'utility curvature with respect to consumption, , to 2, implying an intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) in consumption of 0.5, which is consistent with estimates in the micro literature (e.g., Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002), but we will also estimate this parameter below. Households'utility curvature with respect to labor, , is set to 1.5, implying a Frisch elasticity of 2/3, which is also in line with estimates from the microeconomics literature (e.g., Pistaferri, 2003) . We discuss the parameter and its relationship to the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion in Section 3.2.
We set …rms'output elasticity with respect to labor, , to .7, …rms'steady-state markup, , to .2 (implying a price-elasticity of demand of 6), and the Calvo frequency of price adjustment, , to .75 (implying an average price contract duration of four quarters), all of which are standard in the literature. We set the steady-state capital-output ratio in the model to 2.5 (where output is annualized), and the capital depreciation rate to 2 percent per quarter (implying a steadystate investment-output ratio of 20 percent). Government purchases are assumed to consume order, when X and Y have zero mean (as in a covariance). .004 2 , respectively, consistent with typical estimates in the literature. Finally, the parameter 0 is chosen to normalize the steady-state quantity of labor to unity and the parameter c is chosen to set the Macaulay duration of the consol in the model to ten years, as discussed above.
The Coe¢ cient of Relative Risk Aversion
The degree of household risk aversion is a crucial parameter for our analysis becuase it directly measures the compensation a household requires in order to hold a risky asset. In previous studies of Epstein-Zin preferences, computing household risk aversion is typically straightforward, because those studies exclude labor (being in an endowment economy rather than a DSGE setting) and are homothetic-that is, the quantity of consumption demanded in each period depends linearly on the household's initial wealth. For example, when u(c t ; l t ) = c
and shocks have a multiplicative e¤ect on wealth, then the household's value-to-go V t in each period is equal to a constant (function of parameters) times W 18 In contrast, the value function for the household's optimization problem in our DSGE model is much more complicated. First, the utility kernel is not homothetic due to the presence of labor; 19 second, the shocks in the model do not enter multiplicatively with respect to wealth; and third, the household's true wealth includes human as well as physical capital. For these reasons, the household's value function is not simply separable in wealth-in fact, the household's value function has multiple state variables and, as discussed by Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) , it is di¢ cult to de…ne risk aversion when there is more than one good or more than one state variable. As a result, there is no standard or even unambiguous quantitative measure of risk aversion in our model. 20 In order to compare our model and results to the endowment economy literature, we thus report the quasi-CRRA, 1 (1 )(1 ). The interpretation of this coe¢ cient is that, if labor in our model were held …xed, and if utility were homothetic, and if all the shocks in the model were multiplicative with respect to wealth, then the CRRA in the model would be the quasi-CRRA that we report. In the baseline parameterization of our model given in Table   1 , the Epstein-Zin coe¢ cient is set to 73, and is 2, which implies a quasi-CRRA of 75.
This may seem like a high baseline value, but we will also estimate a high value in the "best …t"exercise below, and it will be helpful for gaining intuition for our results to have a baseline quasi-CRRA that is similarly high.
We emphasize, however, that there are many reasons why this quasi-CRRA is not a very good measure of households' true attitudes toward risk in our model. For example, if we consider gambles over current-period consumption, c t , holding future consumption and current and future labor …xed, the household behaves as if its CRRA were simply , the same as in 18 Recall that when > 1, risk aversion is decreasing in and < 0 corresponds to preferences that are more risk averse than expected utility; when < 1, risk aversion is increasing in and > 0 corresponds to preferences that are more risk averse than expected utility. 19 For the household's preferences to be homothetic, the quantity of consumption and leisure demanded in each period must scale linearly with wealth. This is not the case for any standard utility kernel with consumption and leisure because leisure is bounded above by the household's time endowment. In particular, nonhomotheticity is not speci…c to the additively separable utility kernel (6) . 20 However, see Swanson (2009) for some recent work on this issue. We do know from Epstein and Zin (1989) that, for u (c t ; l t ) 0 everywhere, higher values of correspond to greater risk aversion. The issue here is that we have no easy way to quantify the degree of risk aversion in our model in a way that one could compare to the empirical literature. the expected utility case and far less than the quasi-CRRA of 75. 21 That is, if we think of laboratory experiments using small rewards as a¤ecting only current-period consumption and not future labor supply or consumption, then households in our model would exhibit a risk aversion of = 2 in those experiments. For analogous gambles over next-period consumption, c t+1 , the household behaves as if its CRRA were + c 1 =V , which is about 25 percent higher than under our baseline parameterization, but still much less than the quasi-CRRA. 22 Even for gambles over steady-state consumption, c (that is, the household's level of consumption in every period, holding labor …xed), the household behaves as if its CRRA were + 1 c 1 =V , which is about 55, a high number yet still substantially less than the quasi-CRRA. Thus, the quasi-CRRA is at best only a very rough measure of households'attitudes toward risk in the model.
Even taking the quasi-CRRA in our model at face value, Barillas, Hansen, and Sargent (2008) show that high risk aversion in an Epstein-Zin speci…cation is isomporphic to a model in which households have low risk aversion but a moderate degree of uncertainty about the economic environment. In other words, one of the reasons our simple DSGE model requires a high quasi-CRRA to …t the empirical risk premiums is that households in our model have perfect knowledge about all of the equations of the model, the model's parameter values, and so on. Thus, the quantity of risk in our model is much smaller than in the U.S. economy and, as a result, the household's aversion to risk in our model must be correspondingly higher in order to …t the data.
In addition, Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008) show that the consumption of stockholders is more volatile than the consumption of nonstockholders. As a result, the required level of risk aversion in a representative-agent model like ours is higher than the level of risk aversion that would be required in a model that recognized that asset-holders have more variable consumption than households that do not hold assets. In other words, our simple, representativeagent DSGE model again may understate the true quantity of risk that bondholders in the U.S. economy face. Since our model understates the quantity of risk faced by U.S. households, it requires a higher degree of risk aversion in order to match the risk premiums in the data. 21 That is, letting c t = c + ", the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient is c t (@ 2 V t =@ 2 )=(@V t =@c ) = . Kreps and Porteus (1978) also noted that gambles over current period consumption are viewed the same by a household with generalized recursive preferences as they are by a household with expected utility preferences. 22 In our model,
' :0073, where bars denote steady-state values.
Taken together, these observations suggest that our baseline value for the quasi-CRRA in the model, and the high value that we will estimate below, are not unreasonable and could be reduced greatly if one were to increase the uncertainty and risks faced by bondholders in the model to more realistic levels.
Model Results
We report various model-implied moments in Table 2 , along with the corresponding empirical moments for quarterly U.S. data from 1960 to 2007. The …rst set of rows reports a set of basic macroeconomic moments that the model should be able to match, while the second set of rows reports a set of basic …nancial moments. 23 Additional information about the model moments
and parameter values are reported in the last two sets of rows of the table.
The empirical moments in the …rst column of Table 2 are relatively standard and were computed as follows: consumption, C, is real personal consumption expenditures from the U.S.
national income and product accounts, labor, L, is total hours of production workers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the real wage, w r , is total wages and salaries of production workers from the BLS divided by total production worker hours and de ‡ated by the GDP price index. Standard deviations were computed for logarithmic deviations of each series from a Hodrick-Prescott trend and reported in percentage points. Standard deviations for in ‡ation, interest rates, and the term premium were computed for the raw series rather than for deviations from trend. In ‡ation, , is the annualized rate of change in the quarterly GDP price index from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The short-term nominal interest rate, i, is the end-of-month federal funds rate from the Federal Reserve Board, reported in annualized percentage points. The short-term real interest rate, r, is the short-term nominal interest rate less the realized quarterly in ‡ation rate at an annual rate. The ten-year zero-coupon bond yield, i (40) , is the end-of-month ten-year zero-coupon bond yield taken from Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007). The term premium on the ten-year zero-coupon bond, (40) , is the term premium computed by Kim and Wright (2005) , in annualized percentage points. 24 The yield 23 We omit output from the macro moments because our simple DSGE model has …xed capital and investment, so output and consumption behave very similarly. The standard deviation of the long-term bond yield, i (40) , has some elements of both a "macro" and a "…nance" moment, but we will classify it as a macro moment for the purposes of the table and this discussion. 24 Kim and Wright (2005) use an arbitrage-free, three-latent-factor a¢ ne model of the term structure to compute the term premium. Alternative measures of the term premium using a wide variety of methods produce All variables are quarterly values expressed in percent. In ‡ation, interest rates, the term premium ( ), and excess holding period returns (x) are expressed at an annual rate.
qualitatively similar results in terms of the overall magnitude and variability-see Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson (2007) for a detailed discussion and comparison of several methods.
curve slope and one-period excess holding return are calculated from the data above and are reported in annualized percentage points.
The second column of Table 2 reports results for the baseline version of our model with expected utility preferences (that is, all parameters are the same as in Table 1 , except that = 0, which implies expected utility preferences for the household). The model does a reasonable job of matching the basic macroeconomic moments in the …rst seven rows of the table-indeed, this is one of the main reasons these models have become so widely used in macroeconomics.
However, the term premium implied by the expected utility version of the model is both too small in magnitude-the model implies a term premium of one basis point-and far too stable, with an unconditional standard deviation less than one-tenth of one basis point. This basic …nding of a term premium that is too small and far too stable relative to the data is extremely robust with respect to wide variation of the model's parameters (see Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008 , for additional discussion and sensitivity analysis).
The third column of Table 2 (3) is exactly the same as that of standard expected utility preferences (2), so to …rst order, these two utility speci…cations are the same; and second, the shocks that we consider in the model and which are standard in macroeconomics have standard deviations of only about one percent or less, so a linear approximation to the model is typically very accurate. 25 For asset prices, however, the implications of the Epstein-Zin and expected utility versions of the model are very di¤erent, since risk premia in the model are entirely determined by secondand higher-order terms. With Epstein-Zin preferences, the mean term premium is 43.8 basis 25 As the magnitude of increases, second-order terms in the model become relatively more important for the macroeconomic variables. Yet even for the case = 73, second-order terms do not have a very large e¤ect on the macroeconomic moments in the second column of Table 2 . Intuitively, this is because V is both "twisted"and "untwisted"by the factor (1 ), so that much of the curvature that introduces into the model is e¤ectively neutralized. As a result, the parameter only a¤ects the macro variables in the model through its e¤ect on uncertainty, precautionary motives, and the like, and this has only a small e¤ect on the unconditional moments we report in Table 2. points-almost …fty times higher than under expected utility-and the standard deviation of the term premium is 5.3 bp, compared to less than 0.1 bp for expected utility. 26 The …t of the model to the yield curve slope and excess holding period return show similarly marked improvements. Table 2 that are among the most interesting and important for the term premium-namely, the quasi-CRRA, IES, , , A , and A -to …nd the best …t to the macroeconomic and …nancial moments in Table 2 . 27 We de…ne 26 The mean and standard deviation of the term premium for a ten-year zero-coupon bond in the model are similar: the term premium has a mean of 40.3 bp and an unconditional standard deviation of 2.5 bp. These numbers are a few basis points less than for the ten-year-duration consol, but still far larger than we have been able to obtain with standard or habit-based expected utility speci…cations (see, e.g., Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008) . For the "best …t"parameterization of the model (the …nal column of Table 2 ), the corresponding numbers are a mean term premium of 86.5 bp and standard deviation of 11.0 bp for the 10-year zero-coupon bond. 27 We conducted the search over the following sets of parameter values: quasi-CRRA 2 f1; 15; 30; 45; 60; 75; 90g, IES 2 f:5; :7; :9; 1:1; 1:3; 1:5g, 2 f:5; :8; 1:1; 1:3; 1:5; 1:7; 1:9; 2:2; 2:5g, 2 f:65; :7; :75; :8g, A 2 f:9; :95g, and A 2 f:003; :004; :005; :006; :007; :008; :009; :01; :015; :02g. These sets were chosen to encompass a wide range of estimates in the literature. The parameter A can be varied at little computational cost, and the other parameters were distributed over a four-processor computer to reduce the overall computation time.
the "best …t" to be the set of parameters that matches the equally-weighted sum of squared deviations from the thirteen moments in the …rst column of Table 2 as closely as possible (with one exception: we divide the standard deviation of the excess holding period return x (40) by 10 in order to give it roughly as much weight as the other moments in the column). 28 The distance between the model and the empirical macro moments, …nance moments, and both sets of moments together are reported in the third set of rows in the table, above the parameter values.
The best-…tting parameter values are reported at the bottom of the last column of Table 2 .
These imply a mean term premium of about 106 basis points and a standard deviation of the term premium of 16.2 basis points, a much better …t than the baseline model. To achieve this …t, the estimation procedure picks high values for the quasi-CRRA, 90, and technology shock persistence, A = :95, and a low value for the IES, 0.5. All else equal, a high value for the quasi-CRRA helps the model to …t the …nancial moments in the data, and the low value for the IES helps to make real interest rates relatively more volatile and consumption relatively less 
The Importance of Technology Shocks for the Term Premium
We can gain insight into what features of the model are the most important for the term premium by examining the model's impulse responses to shocks. The …rst column of Figure 2 reports the responses of consumption, in ‡ation, the long-term bond price, and the term premium in the model to a positive one-standard-deviation shock to technology, using the "best …t" parameterization from Table 2 . The second and third columns report analogous impulse responses for one-standard-deviation shocks to government spending and monetary policy, respectively. 29 These impulse responses demonstrate that the correlations between consumption, in ‡ation, and the long-term bond price depend on the type of structural shock.
Over the period 1952-2005, Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) …nd that a surprise increase in U.S. in ‡ation-which lowers the value of nominal bonds-was typically followed by lower consumption going forward. This relationship implies that long-term nominal bonds lose value precisely when households desire consumption the most, resulting in a positive term premium (cf. equation (39)). In the …rst column of Figure 2 , we can see that a technology shock in our structural model also has this feature: that is, in ‡ation falls (rises) while the long-term bond price and future consumption both rise (fall). In contrast to technology shocks, government spending and monetary policy shocks in our model imply a correlation between in ‡ation and consumption that is exactly the opposite: in ‡ation, consumption, and long-term bond prices all fall simultaneously in response to the shock. Thus, the relationship between in ‡ation and consumption depends on the distribution of the underlying shocks that are driving the economy, and the reduced-form in ‡ation-consumption correlation that Piazzesi and Schneider estimate suggests that technology-type shocks predominated over their sample.
While technology shocks are also the most important driver of ‡uctuations in the macroeconomic variables of our DSGE model, the contribution of technology shocks to the model's term premium is even more crucial. As can be seen in Figure 2 , all three shocks imply a negative covariance between the stochastic discount factor and the long-term bond price, and hence a positive term premium, but that covariance is both much larger and much longer-lasting for the technology shock. (This is primarily driven by the large and long-lasting e¤ect that the technology shock has on in ‡ation in the model, which in turn has a large e¤ect on the long-term bond price.) As a result, the technology shock is far more important for the term premium than are the other two shocks, since its impact on the sum of the covariances in equation (39) is so much larger. Thus, in our standard DSGE model as well as in Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) , technology shocks and the negative correlation between in ‡ation and consumption that they generate are crucial for matching the term premium.
This observation provides an answer to a bond-pricing puzzle that dates back to Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989) and Den Haan (1995): namely, why does the yield curve slope upward?
According to the traditional line of thinking, if interest rates are low in a recession (when provide a very good approximation, so only those (linear) terms are plotted. For the term premium, the impulse response is zero to …rst and second order, so the third-order terms are dominant and are plotted in the …gure. consumption is low), then long-term bond prices should be high in a recession and hence longterm bonds should carry an insurance-like, negative risk premium; that is, the yield curve should slope downward rather than upward. In our New Keynesian DSGE model, a technology shock causes in ‡ation to rise persistently at the same time that consumption falls, so long-term nominal bonds lose value rather than gain value in recessions, as long as those recessions are driven by technology shocks. Thus, our model resolves the puzzle by appealing to the behavior of in ‡ation following a technology shock in standard New Keynesian DSGE models. 30 More generally, any shock that causes in ‡ation to move persistently and inversely to output, such as a technology shock, a markup shock, or an oil price shock, will have similar implications for the term premium.
A …nal point to note is that, not only does our simple model predict a term premium that is positive on average, it also implies that the term premium is countercyclical-that is, all three shocks in Figure 2 cause the term premium to rise at the same time that they cause consumption to fall-consistent with a widely-held view in the macro-…nance literature that risk premiums should be and are higher in recessions (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane, 1999 , Cochrane, 2007 , Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008 ). Thus, not only is the term premium in our model large and variable, it is consistent with this key business-cycle correlation.
Time-Varying Risk Aversion and Heteroskedasticity
Epstein-Zin preferences not only improve the model's ability to match the level of the term premium, they also greatly improve the model's ability to generate a term premium that varies over time. For the case of expected utility, the term premium in the model varies by less than one-tenth of one basis point, and this result is extremely robust to varying the model's parameters over wide ranges. In contrast, our baseline Epstein-Zin speci…cation produces a term premium with an unconditional standard deviation of 5.3 basis points, and the "best …t" parameterization does even better, generating a term premium with a 16.2 basis point standard deviation.
In order for the model to generate appreciable time-variation in the term premium, either the 30 Note that this analysis is for long-term nominal bonds rather than real bonds. If real interest rates are lower in recessions, then the traditional line of reasoning still implies that the real yield curve should slope downward. In fact, the evidence in Evans (1998) and Appendix B of Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) suggests that this is the case. stochastic discount factor or the asset return, or both, must display conditional heteroskedasticity. 31 In our model, the exogenous driving shocks (technology, government purchases, monetary policy) are all homoskedastic, but our DSGE model endogenously generates conditional heteroskedasticity in the stochastic discount factor and other variables. Intuitively, a second-or higher-order solution to the stochastic discount factor and other variables in the DSGE model includes terms of the form x t 1 " t , the product of a state variable and a shock, and the conditional variance of these terms varies with the state of the economy x.
With expected utility preferences, these second-order terms and the conditional heteroskedasticity generated by the model are small. But with Epstein-Zin preferences, the size of these second-and higher-order terms is much greater and leads to substantial endogenously-generated heteroskedasticity in the stochastic discount factor, and hence in household risk aversion. From equations (6) and (15), the stochastic discount factor in the model is given by:
Although consumption growth and in ‡ation in the model exhibit a slight degree of heteroskedasticity due to higher-order terms, by far the largest source of heteroskedasticity in (42) is the term involving V . Intuitively, a negative technology shock in our model causes consumption 31 To see this, note that one measure of the risk premium on an asset is E t (m t+1 p t+1 ) e it p t+1 = Cov t (m t+1 ; p t+1 ), the time-t price of the asset less the risk-neutral price. If the stochastic discount factor and asset price are both conditionally homoskedastic, then so is the conditional covariance and hence the risk premium. 32 As discussed above, the one-step-ahead standard deviation of the stochastic discount factor depends on the state of the economy. Since we know the unconditional variances and covariances of the state variables in our model, we can use these to derive the unconditional variance of the one-step-ahead standard deviation of the stochastic discount factor. The square root of that number is about .0145 percent. Multiplying by 2 gives a range of :029 percent. The one-step-ahead standard deviation of the stochastic discount factor will lie within this range about 95% of the time. The periods in which this standard deviation are high (low) are periods of low (high) consumption.
to fall by relatively more than output, because investment and government purchases in the model are …xed (this is one of the nonhomotheticities of the model). Technology shocks, which are multiplicative with respect to output, thus have an increasingly large e¤ect on consumption as output and consumption decline. As a result, the e¤ective quantity of consumption risk faced by households in the model rises as the state of the economy worsens, the one-step-ahead variance of V increases as the state of the economy worsens, and risk premia become larger.
Note that the volatility and heteroskedasticity of V are greatly ampli…ed in (42) Following the empirical evidence in Gürkaynak et al. (2005) ,we assume that t loads to some extent on the recent history of in ‡ation:
There are two main advantages to using speci…cation (43) rather than a simple random walk or AR(1) speci…cation with # = 0. First, (43) allows long-term in ‡ation expectations to respond to current news about in ‡ation and economic activity in a manner that is consistent with the bond market responses documented by Gürkaynak et al. Thus, # > 0 seems to be consistent with the data. 33 Second, if # = 0, then even though t varies over time, it does not do so systematically with output or consumption; as a result, long-term bonds are not particularly risky, in the sense that their returns are not very correlated with the household's stochastic discount factor. In fact, long-term bonds even have some elements of insurance in this case, because a negative shock to " t leads the monetary authority to raise interest rates and depress 33 Gürkaynak et al. …nd that a value of # = :02 is roughly consistent with the bond market data.
output at the same time that it causes long-term bond yields to fall and bond prices to rise, which results in a negative term premium on the bond. By contrast, if # > 0, then a negative technology shock today raises in ‡ation and long-term in ‡ation expectations and depresses bond prices at exactly the same time that it depresses output, which makes holding long-term bonds quite risky and helps the model to match the positive mean term premium we see in the data.
We add equation (43) As can be seen in Figure 1 , the e¤ects of the long-run in ‡ation risk on the term premium are indeed substantial. As the quasi-CRRA is varied along the horizontal axis, holding the other parameters of the model …xed at their baseline values, the term premium is always the highest for the version of the model with long-run in ‡ation risk. That is, by making long-term bonds in the model riskier, the model can generate any given level of the term premium with a lower value for the quasi-CRRA than was possible without long-run in ‡ation risk. Table 3 reports the macroeconomic and …nancial moments that result from introducing longrun in ‡ation risk into our DSGE model. The …rst column repeats the empirical moments from the U.S. data, and the second column reports results for a version of the model with long-run in ‡ation risk and expected utility preferences (that is, with the parameters of the model set to their baseline values, except for = 0). The introduction of time-variation in makes the macroeconomic variables a little more volatile on average, but the …t of the model to the macro data is about as good overall as for the baseline model. The …t of the model to the …nancial moments, however, is also no better-the term premium is still less than one basis point, and its variation is still only about one-tenth of one basis point, far smaller than the data (and this result is extremely robust to varying the parameters of the model over wide ranges). Intuitively, long-run in ‡ation risk increases the quantity of nominal bond risk in the model, but households simply aren't risk-averse enough for that greater quantity of risk to have a noticeable e¤ect on bond prices in the model.
With Epstein-Zin preferences, however, introducing long-run in ‡ation risk into the model has substantial e¤ects. The third column of Table 3 reports results for the model with Epstein- All variables are quarterly values expressed in percent. In ‡ation and interest rates, the term premium ( ), and excess holding period returns (x) are expressed at an annual rate.
Zin preferences and long-run in ‡ation risk, where we have searched over values for , # , and as well as the quasi-CRRA, IES, , , A , and A to …nd the best …t to the empirical moments in the …rst column. 34 Relative to the the second column, the term premium and other …nancial moments generated by the model are much larger and much more in line with the data. Relative to the case of no long-run risk-the last column of Table 2 -the term premium is far more variable once long-term in ‡ation risk is incorporated into the model. 35 Intuitively, when # > 0, technology (and other) shocks have an ever more persistent e¤ect on in ‡ation because of the pass-through from t to t , which makes long-term nominal bonds in the model even more risky. As a result, the term premium in the model is larger and more volatile.
The estimation achieves this improvement in …t by choosing a high value for the quasi-CRRA, which helps to …t the term premium and other …nancial moments with relatively moderate consumption volatility. (Alternatively, the model with long-run in ‡ation risk can …t the macro and …nancial moments just as well as the model without long-run risk, using a lower value for the quasi-CRRA). The time-variation in makes the model as a whole more volatile, so the estimation compensates for this by choosing a lower technology shock variance, A = :005; the greater degree of nominal volatility in the model due to time-varying , together with the smaller degree of real volatility due to technology shocks, improves the overall …t of the model to the macro moments. The estimation also prefers a higher value for the IES, 1.1, which helps shift some of the volatility of consumption over to short-term real interest rates, in line with the data, and a low value for (a high Frisch elasticity of labor supply), which helps shift some of the volatility of real wages over to labor. Finally, a low value for …ts the data the best-as discussed above, exogenous shocks to actually imply a lower term premium, all else equal, because long-term nominal bonds in the model act like insurance against this particular type of shock. It is the loading # of on current in ‡ation that makes time-variation in costly in the model, not exogenous shocks to . 34 In addition to the range of parameter values considered in the previous section, we searched over values of 2 f:98; :99; :995; :997; :998g, # 2 f0; :005; :01; :015; :02g, and 2 f1; 2; : : : ; 15g basis points. 35 These results hold for a ten-year zero-coupon bond in the model as well: the term premium has a mean of 76.2 bp and a standard deviation of 39.7 bp. These are a few basis points less than for the consol, but the main points in the text are all unchanged.
Long-Run Productivity Risk
Finally, we investigate to what extent a long-run real risk could help to explain the …nancial market moments in our model with less reliance on a high value for the quasi-CRRA. Bansal and Yaron (2004) found that a relatively small but highly persistent long-run risk to consumption can account for a variety of risk premium puzzles in an endowment economy framework. In our DSGE setting, consumption is not an exogenous process, but we can model long-run real risk in the economy as a long-run risk to productivity. Analogous to Bansal and Yaron, we thus assume that the level of aggregate technology A has a small but highly persistent component A as well as an i.i.d. component:
log A t = log A t + "
where the shocks " and "
A t are uncorrelated white noise. 36 We then replace equation (17) of our DSGE model with (44) and (45), holding …xed for simplicity, and search over the values of A , A , and A (as well as the quasi-CRRA, IES, , and ) that …t the data the best. 37 The …nal column of Table 3 reports the results from incorporating this long-run risk into our DSGE model. The model with long-run productivity risk does not …t the empirical macroeconomic moments as well as the model with long-run in ‡ation risk, but the …t to the …nancial moments is about as good. Relative to the model without long-run risk-the last column of Table 2-the …t to the macroeconomic variables is slightly better overall and the …t to the …nancial moments is improved, particularly for the standard deviations of the term premium and excess holding period return. As in the model without long-run risk, the estimation chooses a high value for the quasi-CRRA, 90, and low value for the IES, 0.5. The long-run risk itself is chosen to be only moderately persistent, A = :97, which …ts the macroeconomic data better than a combination of a large i.i.d. technology shock together with a small but extremely persistent process for A .
Conclusions
In stark contrast to our earlier work with habits (Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008 ), here we have found that introducing Epstein-Zin preferences into a DSGE model is a very successful strategy for matching both the basic macroeconomic and …nancial moments in the data. We are able to obtain a large and volatile term premium in an otherwise standard, structural DSGE model, thus generalizing the earlier endowment economy results in …nance. Our model o¤ers a structural explanation for why the yield curve slopes upward (technology-type shocks that cause in ‡ation and output to move in opposite directions), and endogenously generates conditional heteroskedasticity in the stochastic discount factor-and hence a time-varying risk premiumwithout relying on exogenous conditional heteroskedasticity in the driving shocks. Introducing long-run risks into the model allows us to …t the data with a lower value for the quasi-CRRA, or to …t the data even better for a given level of the quasi-CRRA.
Of course, many unresolved issues remain for exploration. Although we have restricted further study, in our view. In short, there appear to be many fruitful avenues for future research in this area. Impulse responses of consumption, inflation, long-term bond prices, and term premiums to positive one standard deviation shocks to technology, government spending, and monetary policy. 
Appendix: Equations of the Model
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